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INTRODUCTION
Only one thing is impossible for God: To find any
sense in any copyright law on the planet – Mark Twain,
American Author
Copyright is a type of intellectual property that is granted
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.” 1 In Garcia v. Google Inc., 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“the Ninth Circuit”)
improperly held that Cindy Lee Garcia (“Garcia”), an ordained
Christian minister turned aspiring actress, was “likely to
prevail” 3 on a copyright claim for authorship of the
controversial trailer for Innocence of Muslims (“the Film”),
which she appeared in for a mere five seconds as a supporting

929.

1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).
2. Garcia v. Google, Inc., et al., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d 766 F.3d
3. Id. at 935.
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actress. 4 The Garcia opinion, as it stood prior to an en banc
opinion that reversed the Ninth Circuit, threatened to create a
new category of copyright interest that transforms a motion
picture, which is a unitary work, into a patchwork of
overlapping property claims. 5 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision created uncertainty and increased liability for
companies engaged in content streaming.
This Comment will begin with an overview of United
States Copyright law, focusing on authorship requirements
and rights of owners. 6 Next, this Comment will discuss the
background of Garcia, 7 the Ninth Circuit’s original holding and
en banc reversal, 8 and an analysis of the legal and business
issues arising from that holding. 9 This Comment will then
propose a new test for analyzing whether an actor/actress
should be declared an author of a motion picture based on his
or her performance in said motion picture. 10 This test places
the burden upon the actor/actress to prove more than a
minimal form of contribution to the motion picture and
suggests an analysis of the following factors: (1) the role of the
actor/actress within the motion picture; (2) the significance of
that role within the motion picture; (3) the level of control and
discretion afforded to the actor/actress in conveying his or her
role; and (4) the level of control afforded to the actor/actress in
production of the motion picture as a whole. Lastly, the
proposed test will be applied to three hypothetical authorship
claims. 11

4. Although Garcia only appeared for five seconds, her appearance was
arguably the most controversial. See infra notes 121–22.
5. Oral Argument at 20:30, Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., 766 F.3d 929 (9th
Cir. 2014), available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_
id=0000000725
6. See infra Part I.A–B.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part I.D–E. The opinion at the center of this Comment is the
Ninth Circuit’s original opinion, 796 F.3d 929. Although the Ninth Circuit
reversed its original opinion, making the issues raised in that opinion moot, the
discussion of authorship in the context of motion pictures remains relevant and
could be challenged in the future. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit is not the only
circuit to have faced this issue. See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, No. 133865, 2015 WL 3937947 (2d Cir. June 29, 2015).
9. See infra Part II–III.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.B–D.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of United States Copyright
Law
The evolution of copyright law in the United States is one
of “gradual expansion” 12 that begins with the Constitution and
is followed by three important pieces of legislation.
1. Constitutional Grant
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution (“the Copyright Clause”) empowers Congress: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings.” 13 The Supreme Court has identified the
Copyright Clause as both a “grant of power and a limitation.” 14
To be deemed an author under the Copyright Clause, an
individual must prove: (1) originality; and (2) some minimal
degree of human intellectual labor or creativity. 15 The term
“Writings” is construed broadly to mean a tangible, physical
embodiment of authorship. 16 Copyright relief stems strictly
from statutory authorization and not from a common law
right. 17
2. 1790 Copyright Statue (“the 1790 Statute”)
The first United States Copyright statute was enacted in
1790 and was influenced primarily by the English Statute of
Anne. 18 The 1790 Statute granted copyright protection to
maps, charts, and books for a term of fourteen years. 19
Congress slowly added various works to the 1790 Statute,
including prints in 1802, musical compositions in 1831,
dramatic compositions in 1856, photographs in 1865, and
12. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
13. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
15. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). For
a discussion of Feist and the originality element, see infra Part I.A.4.c.
16. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
17. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657–58, 661–62 (1834).
18. Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha Ghosh & Mary LaFrance,
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 256 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2011).
19. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
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works of fine art in 1870. 20
3. Copyright Act of 1909 (“the 1909 Act”)
The 1909 Act granted copyright to “all the writings of an
author.” 21 Unlike the broad constitutional interpretation of
“Writings,” 22 the term “writings” in the 1909 Act came with
limitation. 23 Section 5 of the 1909 Act listed eleven categories
of copyrightable work, including, among others: books,
periodicals, dramatic compositions, musical compositions,
works of art, photographs, and pictorial illustrations. 24 In
1912, “motion picture photoplays” and “motion pictures other
than photoplays” were incorporated into the 1909 Act. 25 The
1909 Act provided copyright protection for a term of twentyeight years, commencing upon publication, which could be
renewed once for a total of fifty-six years. 26
Congress believed that awarding an exclusive right to an
author for a limited time achieved the ultimate goal of
fostering the growth of learning and culture for the public
welfare. 27 The 1976 Report of the Register of Copyrights, which
was prepared in anticipation of the revisions ultimately
enacted in the Copyright Act of 1976, argued that although
public interest must coincide with authors’ rights, public
interest nonetheless outweighs authors’ rights. 28 The 1909 Act
remains relevant today because it continues to govern
copyrights that were obtained by publication or registration

20. Margreth Barrett, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 406
(West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1995).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
22. See supra text accompanying note 16.
23. Chisum, supra note 18, at 257.
24. Id.
25. Jay F. Dougherty, Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues In The Authorship Of
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 233 (2001).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6–7 (1909) (recognizing
that: “[t]he Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress
shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best. Not primarily for the
benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given. In enacting the copyright law Congress must consider . . . how much the
monopoly granted will be detrimental to the public.”).
28. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 90
(Comm. Print 1961) (explaining an “author’s interests [must] coincide with those
of the public. Where they conflict, the public interest must prevail.”).
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prior to 1978. 29
4. Copyright Act of 1976 (“the 1976 Act”)
Under the 1976 Act, which governs most copyrights
granted today, copyright exists in “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 30 The House
Reports for the 1976 Act indicate that Congress purposely left
undefined the phrase “original works of authorship.” 31 Instead,
Congress sought to maintain the standard of originality
established by courts under the 1909 Act. 32 Congress also
recognized that authors would continue to find new ways of
expressing themselves, and that the 1976 Act could not limit
those expressive forms which may be discovered nor allow
unlimited expansion. 33
The 1976 Act expressly preempted state copyright
protection. 34 The 1976 Act unified the law by extending federal
copyright protection to both published and unpublished works,
commencing on the date the work is fixed in tangible form. 35
Moreover, the 1976 Act replaced the former system of
renewable copyright terms 36 with a single term consisting of
the life of the author plus fifty years. 37
a. Copyrightable Subject Matter
Title 17 of the United States Code section 102(a) sets forth
the following categories of copyrightable subject matter: (1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
29. Some copyrights granted under the 1909 Act will continue until
December 31, 2072, maintaining the 1909 Copyright Act’s relevance. Thus, we
should continue to consider the intent of the 1909 Act.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
31. H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 51 (“The phrase original works of authorship,
which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the
standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright
statue. This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or
aesthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright
protection to require them”) (emphasis added).
32. H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 51.
33. H.R. REP. NO. 1576, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 51 (1976).
34. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301.
35. Barrett, supra note 20, at 406–07.
36. See supra note 26.
37. See 17 U.S.C.A § 302. A subsequent amendment extended the duration
of the term to the life of the author plus 70 years, i.e., an additional twenty years.
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-28, 12
Stat. 2827.
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words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works. 38 Title 17 of the United States Code section 102(b) also
sets forth uncopyrightable subject matter, specifically “any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 39
b. Fixation
Title 17 of the United States Code section 101 states: “A
work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecords . . . is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.” 40
In the context of a motion picture, Congress noted that the
content of a live transmission should be regarded as fixed and
should be afforded statutory protection. 41 However, Congress
cautioned that fixation should exclude “purely evanescent or
transient reproductions” such as images projected briefly on a
screen, shown electronically on a television, or captured
momentarily. 42
c. Originality
Originality does not mean that a work is novel or unique. 43
Instead, originality means that the material originates from
the purported author and is not copied. 44 In Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 45 a Supreme Court case predating
the 1976 Act that challenged the copyrightability of a
photograph of Oscar Wilde, the Court held that photographs
were copyrightable because “they are representatives of

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 52–53.
H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 52–53.
Doughtery, supra note 25, at 235.
Doughtery, supra note 25, at 235.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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original intellectual conceptions of the author.” 46 The Court
reasoned that originality should be found because of plaintiff’s
level of control over the costumes, accessories and arrangement
of the photo. 47 Stated differently, the author’s creative control
over the photograph entitled him to copyright protection. 48
The Court again touched on the originality requirement in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 49
explaining
that “originality” requires: (1) independent
creation; and (2) some minimal degree of creativity.” 50 The
Court described the level of creativity required as “extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice.” 51 The Court instructed
courts to look for “some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude,
humble or obvious’ it might be.” 52 The Court imposed a
limitation on originality, holding that copyright protection may
extend only to those components of a work that are original to
the author. 53 This reasoning served as the basis for holding
that telephone white pages organized alphabetically by
individuals’ last names were not original because the alleged
originality was “devoid of even the slightest trace of
creativity.” 54
As an alternative reason for striking down the alleged
originality of the white pages, the Feist Court reasoned that
Respondent Rural might not even have truly selected to
publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers in
the way it did. 55 Instead, the Kansas Corporation Commission,
as a condition of granting a monopoly, required Rural to
alphabetically arrange the names. 56 As a result, the Court
46. Id. at 58.
47. See id. at 60 (explaining how plaintiff created the picture “entirely from
his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the
said [picture subject] Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging
the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph,
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression and from such
disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he
produced the picture in suit”) (emphasis added).
48. See id.
49. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
50. Id. at 345.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 1.08[C][1]).
53. Id. at 348.
54. Id. at 362.
55. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
56. See id.
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recognized the possibility that Rural’s alleged creative or
original contribution was in reality dictated by an external
force—the Kansas Corporation Commission—not by Rural. 57
d. Authorship
Authorship is a constitutional prerequisite to copyright
protection. 58 Title 17 of the United States Code section 101
does not define authorship. 59 However, in Burrow-Giles, the
Supreme Court defined an author as “he to whom anything
owes its origin; originator; maker, one who completes a work of
science or literature.” 60
In the context of a motion picture, European countries
utilize a bright-line statutory definition of author as “the
principal director, the principal screenwriter, and the
composer.” 61 In the United States, questions of authorship in
the context of motion pictures are typically avoided through
routine application of the “work made for hire” doctrine. 62
In Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 63 the Ninth Circuit addressed
the issue of authorship in a motion picture in the context of a
joint authorship claim. In that case, Spike Lee entered into a
contract with Warner Brothers to make the movie Malcolm X. 64
Lee co-wrote the screenplay, directed and co-produced the
motion picture, which starred Denzel Washington as Malcolm
At Mr. Washington’s request, Petitioner Jefri
X. 65
Aalmuhammed was asked to assist Washington in preparation
for the role because Aalmuhammed knew a great deal about
Malcolm X and Islam. 66 Aalmuhammed’s involvement in the

57. See id. In the context of Garcia, this reasoning is critical because Garcia’s
alleged creativity, i.e., her performance in the Film, is arguably controlled by an
external factor: her producer. This argument is further discussed infra at notes
179–81.
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 for a list of pertinent Copyright Act definitions, none
of which define authorship.
60. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
61. Chisum, supra note 18, at 286 (citing Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29
Oct. 1993, Harmonizing the Term for Protection of Copyright and Certain Related
Rights, Art. 2)).
62. Doughtery, supra note 25, at 269. For a discussion of copyright
ownership under the work made for hire doctrine, see infra Part II.B.2.a.
63. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
64. Id. at 1229.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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motion picture was: (1) reviewing the shooting script and
suggesting script revisions; (2) directing Denzel Washington
and other actors while on set; (3) creating at least two entire
scenes with new characters; (4) translating Arabic into English
for subtitles; (5) supplying his own voice for voice-overs; (6)
selecting proper prayers and religious practices for the
characters; and (7) editing parts of the movie during post
production. 67
Similar to Garcia, Aalmuhammed did not have a written
contract with Warner Brothers, Lee, or Lee’s production
companies. 68 After cashing a $25,000 check from Lee and
receiving $100,000 from Denzel Washington, Aalmuhammed
asked for a writing credit as a co-writer of Malcolm X, but was
rejected. 69 Instead, Aalmuhammed was credited as an “Islamic
Technical Consultant.” 70 After receiving a Certificate of
Registration from the United States Copyright Office, 71
Aalmuhammed filed a complaint against, among others, Spike
Lee, his production company, and Warner Brothers seeking,
among other relief, declaratory relief and accounting under the
Copyright Act. 72 After dismissal of his claims, Aalmuhammed
appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit articulated various interpretations of
“author.” First, the court described an author as “the
originator or the person who causes something to come into
being.” 73 The court also described an author as one who
“superintends” the work by exercising control. 74 Lastly, the
court described author as “ ‘ the inventive or master mind’ who
‘creates or gives effect to the idea.’ ” 75 The court reasoned that

67. Id. at 1229–30.
68. Id. at 1230. The fact that no contract existed between Warner Brothers
and Aalmuhammed demonstrates that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s belief in
Garcia, studios do not always contract with the various individuals involved in
production. See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (suggesting that
Garcia is a limited decision because Garcia-issues are often avoided through work
made for hire agreements).
69. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1230.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1232.
74. Id. at 1234 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53, 58 (1884)).
75. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at
61)(citation omitted).
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authorship required more than minimal creative or original
contribution to a work. 76
The Ninth Circuit held that Aalmuhammed was not an
author because: (1) Aalmuhammed did not superintend the
work; (2) Aalmuhammed was not the person who actually
formed the picture by putting the persons in position or
arranging the place;(3) Aalmuhammed could not have
benefited from the work unless the director chose to accept his
recommendations; and (4) valuable contribution is not enough
for co-authorship. 77
Although Aalmuhammed may be limited to the context of
joint authorship claims, the dissent in Garcia argues that
Aalmuhammed articulated “general principles” of authorship
that should be considered when analyzing Garcia’s authorship
claim. 78
B. Copyright Ownership
This section will address general copyright ownership
principals, followed by joint ownership principles, namely the
work made for hire doctrine and joint works of authorship.
1. General Rights of the Copyright Holder
Copyright protection enables an author to prevent others
from reproducing his individual expression without his
consent. 79 However, copyright does not preclude others from
using the ideas or information revealed by the author’s work. 80
Moreover, copyright only prevents others from copying the
author’s particular method of expressing ideas or facts,
providing no rights in the underlying ideas or facts. 81 Under
the current copyright system, federal copyright arises
automatically, as a matter of law, as soon as a qualifying work
of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 82
76. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58).
77. Id. at 1235.
78. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, N.R.,
dissenting) (arguing that Aalmuhammed pulled authorship principles from the
Supreme Court case Burrow-Giles Litographic Co. v. Sarony, which had nothing
to do with joint works).
79. Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
80. Barrett, supra note 20, at 402. For example, independent creation is not
an infringement of copyright.
81. Barrett, supra note 20, at 409.
82. Barrett, supra note 20, at 408–09.
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Some European countries have characterized copyright as
a personal right of the author, or as a combination of personal
and property rights. 83 On the theory of personal rights,
countries have included in their copyright laws a “moral
rights” provision. 84 These provisions seek to protect the author
against certain acts injurious to his or her personal identity or
reputation. 85 These rights include, among other rights,
preventing the reproduction of the author’s work in a distorted
or degrading form. 86 The United States has never recognized
such moral rights of authors. 87
United States Copyright law imposes certain limitations
and conditions on copyright protection:
(1) The rights of the copyright owner do not extend to
certain uses of the work;
(2) The term of copyright is limited, as required by the
Constitution;
(3) A notice of copyright in published works is required;
(4) The registration of copyrights and the recordation of
transfers of ownership are required. 88

These limitations often juxtapose against the interest of
allowing an author to receive the widest potential
dissemination of his or her work. 89 Thus, the above limitations
seek to not become so burdensome as to restrict or deprive
authors of their justified reward. 90
2. Joint Ownership
Title 17 of the United States Code section 201(a) states
that copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the
work.” 91 However, where more than one person participates in
a work’s creation, the work may be classified as, among other
classifications, a work made for hire or a joint work. 92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 403.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 405.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 405.
Barrett, supra note 20, at 405.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
Barrett, supra note 20, at 658.
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a. Work Made for Hire
Title 17 of the United States Code section 201(b) states
“the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared
is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.” 93 “Work made for hire” is statutorily defined
pursuant to two scenarios:
(1) a work is prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment (“Scenario 1”); or
(2) a work is specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work . . . if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire
(“Scenario 2”). 94

As recognized by the Supreme Court, the work made for
hire doctrine carries “profound significance for freelance
creators - including artists, writers, photographers, designers,
composers . . . and for the publishing, advertising, music, and
other industries which commission their work.” 95
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 96 the
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) retained
Respondent James Earl Reid to produce a sculpture. 97 The
parties agreed that the project would cost no more than
$15,000, not including Reid’s services, which he offered to
donate. 98 The parties did not sign a written agreement or
mention copyright. 99 The Court held that Congress, “in using
the term ‘employee’ . . . meant to refer to a hired party in a
conventional employment relationship.” 100 As a result, the

93. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). Here, there is no evidence of a written instrument
between Youssef and Garcia, triggering the work made for hire doctrine.
94. Here, Scenario 1 is relevant because there is no evidence of a written
instrument between Youssef and Garcia, voiding Scenario 2.
95. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 733.
98. Id. at 734.
99. Id. at 734. Without a written contract, “Scenario 2” of the work made for
hire doctrine, see supra at note 94, is voided. CCNV thus argued work made for
hire under Scenario 1, i.e., that Reid was an employee of CCNV acting within the
scope of his employment.
100. Id. at 743.
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Court, applying Restatement (Second) of Agency principals of
agency, applied the following factors in considering whether
Reid was an “employee” for the purpose of the “work for hire”
doctrine:
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities
and tools; [3] the location of the work; [4] the duration of
the relationship between the parties; [5] whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party; [6] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over
when and how long to work; [7] the method of payment; [8]
the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; [9]
whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business;
[11] the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the tax
treatment of the hired party. 101

The Court held that Reid was not an employee of CCNV
but was instead an independent contractor. 102 Because Reid
was an independent contractor without a signed agreement,
the sculpture did not qualify as a work made for hire. 103 In
practice, courts have treated the financial relationship
between the parties, including payroll formalities and tax
treatment, as highly probative. 104
b. Joint Works
Under Title 17 of the United States Code section 101, a
“joint work” is defined as “a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 105
The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work and are treated as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of
101. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52. The
Court also stated that no one factor is determinative.
102. Id. at 753 (1989).
103. Id.
104. Chisum, supra note 18, at 323 (citing Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005 (8th
Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Aymes v.
Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “every case since Reid . . . has
found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party
failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”); But see JustMed Inc., v.
Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a programmer was an employee
despite the fact that he worked at home, was not paid benefits, and did not have
taxes withheld).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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a work. 106 Because of this relationship, the Ninth Circuit has
held that “a joint author cannot be held liable for copyright
infringement against another joint owner.” 107 Moreover, where
one person makes a relatively small contribution to a work
predominately created by another, courts are reluctant to find
joint authorship. 108 In addition, courts have added two
statutory requirements to the joint work criterion: (1) each
author must contribute copyrightable expression to the final
work, and (2) the parties must intend themselves to be joint
authors. 109
C. Background of Garcia
On July 2, 2012, a fourteen-minute trailer entitled
Innocence of Muslims 110 (“the Film”) was uploaded to
Subsequent to the upload, the Film was
YouTube. 111
translated to Arabic and uploaded several more times in the
weeks leading up to the thirteenth anniversary of the
The Film gained
September 11th terrorism attacks. 112
worldwide recognition and became the object of hostile
attention in many countries. 113 The Film was also allegedly
tied to the September 11, 2012 ambushing of the U.S. Embassy
in Benghazi, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans
and the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens. 114
106. Chisum, supra note 18, at 325 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476).
107. Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Richmond v.
Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 46 (9th Cir. 1965)); Picture Music, Inc., v. Bourne, Inc., 314
F. Supp. 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
108. See, e.g., Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
109. Chisum, supra note 18, at 328.
110. The Film was also uploaded under titles “Muhammad Movie” and “The
Real Life of Muhammad.” See Zachary Zahos, The Art of Defamation, THE
CORNELL DAILY SUN, (October 4, 2014), http://cornellsun.com/blog/2012/09/19
/the-art-of-defamation/.
111. First Amended Complaint at 2, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Nakoula Basseley
Nakoula, et al., No. 12-8315 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) (hereinafter “F.A. Compl.”).
112. Ian Lovett, Man Linked to Film in Protests is Questioned, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, (September 15, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/
middleeast/man-linked-to-film-in-protests-is-questioned.html?_r=0.
113. See F.A. Compl. at 2. See also Rick Gladstone, Anti-American Protests
Flare Beyond the Mideast, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (September 14, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/world/middleeast/anti-american-protestsover-film-enter-4th-day.html?pagewanted=all.
114. Margaret Coker, et al., Libya Attack Sparks Crisis, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, (September 13, 2012) http://on.wsj.com/OG7HV0. However, former
CIA director David Petraeus later told Congress that the events in Benghazi had

4_FERRARI FINAL

390

3/25/2016 10:59 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

In July 2011, Garcia responded to a casting call posted by
Defendant Nakoula Basseley Nakoula (“Youssef”) 115 for the
Film. 116 The producer of the Film described it as “an
‘adventure’ story set in the Arabian Desert 2,000 years ago.” 117
Garcia concedes her role in the Film was merely “an
actress.” 118 Garcia was “given only specific pages” of the script
and had no involvement in writing, directing, filming, editing,
or producing the Film. 119 Youssef held himself out to be “the
writer and producer” of the Film and Garcia conceded that
Youssef “managed all aspects of the production.” 120
The line that Garcia provided during production was:
Is George crazy? Our daughter is but a child? 121

However, the version of the Film that was ultimately
broadcasted on YouTube retained Garcia’s visual appearance,
but dubbed in the words:
Is your Mohammed a child molester? 122

As a result of those words, Egyptian cleric Ahmad Fouad
Ashoush issued a fatwa directed at Garcia and every other
person appearing in the Film. 123 Soon thereafter, Garcia
became the subject of numerous death threats. 124
Garcia filed eight takedown notices with YouTube. 125
YouTube did not remove or disable the content and instead
denied Garcia’s requests. 126
On September 19, 2012 Garcia filed a lawsuit against,
nothing to do with the Film. Ben Shapiro, THE PEOPLE VS. BARACK OBAMA, 55
(Threshold Editions 2014).
115. Mr. Nakoula has many aliases, but will be referred to in this Comment
as “Youssef.”
116. F.A. Compl. at 7.
117. Brief of Appellant Cindy Lee Garcia at 16, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google
Inc., et al., No. 12-57302 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (hereinafter “Garcia Opening
Br.”).
118. Appellees Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Answering Brief at 10, Cindy
Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., No. 12-57302 (9th Circuit Feb. 15, 2013)
(hereinafter “Google/YouTube Answering Br.”).
119. Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 10.
120. Id.
121. Garcia Opening Br. at 17.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 19 (“I issue a fatwa and call on the Muslim youth in America and
Europe to do this duty, which is to kill the director, the producer and the actors
and everyone who helped and promoted the film.”).
124. Id. at 20.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Id. at 23.
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among others, Youssef, Google and YouTube in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. 127
Garcia’s First Amended Complaint alleged the following
causes of action: (1) Direct Infringement of Copyright; (2)
Secondary Infringement of Copyright; (3) Fraud; (4) Unfair
Business Practices; (5) Libel; and (6) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. 128 On October 17, 2012, Garcia filed an Ex
Parte Application for Preliminary Injunction, which the court
On
treated as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 129
November 30, 2012, Garcia’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction was denied. 130 Garcia subsequently appealed.
D. Holding of the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Garcia was
“likely to succeed on her copyright claim.” 131 The Ninth Circuit
broke its copyright analysis into three issues: (1) an
independent copyright interest; (2) work made for hire; and (3)
implied license. 132
1. Independent Copyright Interest
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Garcia did not
qualify as a joint author because Garcia expressly disclaimed
the intent required to be deemed a joint author. 133 However,
the court reasoned that disqualification as a joint author of an
entire work had no bearing on a copyright claim over a creative
contribution to said work. 134 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
copyright could still be recognized for creative contribution to
a work because an actor “live[s] his part inwardly, and then . . .

127. Compl. For (1) Direct Infringement of Copyright, (2) Secondary
Infringement of Copyright, (3) Fraud, (4) Unfair Business Practices, (5) Libel, (6)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et
al., No. 2-12-cv-08315 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012). Garcia subsequently filed a
First Amended Complaint on October 4, 2012.
128. F.A. Compl. at 9–18.
129. Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 7.
130. Id. at 9.
131. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014).
132. See id. at 933–39.
133. Id. at 933 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231–36 (9th Cir.
2000)). Moreover, it is likely Garcia sought to avoid a declaration of joint
authorship because such a determination would bar her copyright infringement
cause of action against Youssef. See supra text accompanying note 107.
134. See Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
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gives to his experience an external embodiment.” 135 This
“external embodiment” includes “body language, facial
expression and reactions to other actors and elements of a
scene.” 136 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Garcia “may have”
a copyright interest in the Film. 137
However, the Ninth Circuit limited Garcia’s copyright
interest to “her own contribution” but not in “preexisting
material” such as the words or actions dictated in the script.” 138
In other words, Garcia could assert a copyright interest only in
the portion of the Film that represented her individual
creativity. 139
2. Work Made For Hire
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Google and YouTube’s claim
that Garcia was an employee of Youssef. 140 The court found no
evidence that Youssef directed the Film or “controlled the
manner” in which Garcia’s scene was shot. 141 The court
claimed that Youssef only wrote the script. 142 In applying the
factors set forth in CCNV 143 to determine whether Garcia was
an employee or an independent contractor, the court concluded
that Garcia was not an employee of Youssef’s because Youssef
was not in the regular business of making films. 144
3. Implied License
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Google that Garcia granted

135. Id. at 933–34.
136. Id. at 934.
137. Id. at 948.
138. Id. at 935. This determination is consistent with the copyright limitation
articulated in Feist, supra note 53.
139. Id. (recognizing that “even if [Garcia’s] contribution is relatively minor,
it isn’t de minimus.”).
140. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2014). In
essence, Google/YouTube attempted to trigger “Scenario 2,” see supra note 94,
under the work for hire doctrine, arguing that Garcia performed her scene as an
employee within the scope of her employment.
141. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 936.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying note 101 for a restatement of the twelve
CCNV factors.
144. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 936–37 (reasoning that Youssef was not in the
regular business of making films because he did not have union contracts,
relationships with prop houses or other film suppliers, leases of studio space, or
distribution agreements).
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Youssef an implied license to use her performance. 145
However, the Ninth Circuit held that Youssef exceeded the
bounds of Garcia’s implied license. 146 The court hinged upon
the fact that Youssef lied to Garcia in order to secure her
participation and that she agreed to perform in reliance on that
lie. 147 This fraud alone voided any implied license Garcia
granted to Youssef. 148
E. Subsequent Rehearing En Banc
On March 12, 2014 Google and YouTube filed a Petition
for Rehearing En Banc. 149 Google argued that “[t]he majority’s
opinion triggered deep concern in the entertainment and video
industries - industries centered within [the Ninth] circuit. The
majority’s decision empowers even minor players in films to
wave around the threat of an injunction to shut down
distribution.” 150
On November 12, 2014, the Ninth Circuit granted the
Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Google and YouTube. 151 On
December 15, 2014, counsel for Garcia and Google/YouTube
presented oral arguments. 152 In its en banc opinion, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the decision of the original three-judge panel
of the Ninth Circuit. 153 The en banc opinion ultimately showed
strong deference to the Copyright Office, whom rejected

145. Id. at 937.
146. See id.
147. See id. Youssef lied to Garcia by telling her the Film was an adventure
story set in the Arabian Desert. In reality, the Film was a reprehensible political
propaganda piece.
148. Id.
149. Petition for Rehearing En Banc By Google and YouTube, Cindy Lee
Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., No. 12-57302 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014).
150. See Kurt Orzeck, Google Wins 9th Cir. En Banc Rehearing In ‘Muslims’
Row, LAW360 (November 12, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/595474
/google -wins-9th-circ-en-banc-rehearing-in-muslims-row.
151. Id.
152. See Brandon Lowry, Google Tells En Banc 9th Cir. Video Ruling May
Fracture IP, LAW360 (December 15, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/
604939/google-tells-en-banc-9th-circ-video-ruling-may-fracture-ip. Some have
called the en banc decision “one of the most, if not the most, important intellectual
property decisions of 2014.” Stephen Wiman, On December 15, 2014, The Ninth
Circuit En Banc Will Hear Garcia v. Google, Inc./Actors And Producers Await
The Result,
JDSUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (December 4, 2014),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/on-december-15-2014-the-ninth-circuit72575/.
153. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Garcia’s copyright application. 154
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUE
An insignificant supporting actor/actress who had no
control over his or her performance or the motion picture as a
whole should not be found to be an author for purposes of
copyright. However, the Garcia opinion, prior to its reversal,
arguably extended authorship to anyone who creatively
contributed to a motion picture. Moreover, the Garcia opinion
conflicts with Feist, specifically the inquiry regarding whether
an individual has discretion over his or her alleged creative
contribution. 155
Garcia is of interest not only to the legal community
because it muddles United States copyright law, but also to
Hollywood and the business community because it impacts
movie studios and companies that engage in content
streaming. 156 The remainder of this Comment will analyze the
original Garcia opinion, i.e., prior to the en banc reversal,
identify and discuss its far-reaching implications, and propose
a solution to those issues. Although the Ninth Circuit’s en banc
opinion later reached the correct conclusion in denying
Garcia’s copyright claim, this Comment serves to discuss and
outline the dangers of accepting a copyright claim similar to
Garcia’s, should another “Garcia” claim arise. 157 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit only reached the correct conclusion after
undergoing an en banc proceeding, which implies that there is
continued disagreement within the court over whether Garcia
should be granted copyright authorship. Although the Garcia
opinion at focus in this Comment is now moot, this Comment
154. Id. at 741.
155. See supra notes 55–57.
156. Netflix, for example, is a subscription service that provides members
with access to motion pictures, television, and other audio-visual entertainment.
See NETFLIX TERMS OF USE, https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last visited
Feb. 3, 2016). Netflix is required to obtain the consent of any author of a motion
picture or television series prior to allowing access to said motion picture or
television series. Id. Thus, under Garcia, Netflix would be required to obtain the
consent of any individual who creatively contributed to the motion picture or
television series, including cameramen, makeup artists, and supporting actors or
actresses. This is not only impractical, discussed infra at Part III.C, but forces
Netflix to engage in speculative analyses regarding whether an individual is an
author under Garcia.
157. Garcia claims have been filed in other circuits. See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse,
LLC v. Merkin, No. 13-3865, 2015 WL 3937947 (2d Cir. June 29, 2015).
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may aid other courts seeking to reject claims similar to Garcia
and presents a novel test that allows courts to strike a balance
in the face of future Garcia claims.
III. ANALYSIS
This analysis will first discuss whether Garcia has a
copyright interest by examining the following four issues: (1)
whether Aalmuhammed should have been afforded more
consideration and, under Aalmuhammed, whether Garcia is
the “master mind” of the Film; 158 (2) whether a high degree of
“control” should be required to classify an actor/actress as an
author; 159 (3) whether the exclusive rights of an author are
weakened under Garcia; 160 and (4) whether the cases relied
upon by Garcia are distinguishable. 161 The analysis of whether
Garcia has a copyright interest will conclude by addressing
whether, as the Ninth Circuit believed, Garcia is a limited
opinion and whether judicial efficiency is best served under
Garcia. 162
Next, this analysis will re-examine the Garcia court’s work
for hire analysis, specifically arguing that the court arbitrarily
relied on one factor. 163 Finally, this Comment will examine the
broader implications of Garcia for companies that engage in
content streaming. 164
A. Garcia’s Copyright Interest
1. Aalmuhammed deserves more consideration than
the Ninth Circuit afforded it. Under
Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind” of
the Film.
The Ninth Circuit should have afforded Aalmuhammed
more weight because although that case was decided in the
context of joint authorship, it articulated “general principles”
of authorship that are applicable to Garcia’s interest in her

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part II.A.4.
See infra Part II.A.5.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.

4_FERRARI FINAL

396

3/25/2016 10:59 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

performance. 165
Moreover, Aalmuhammed heightens the
requirements of authorship, which is justified considering an
author of a motion picture can dictate the distribution of said
motion picture. As reprehensible as the Film was, Garcia
should have faced a heightened requirement for authorship
considering she attempted to dictate the distribution of the
Film by petitioning for its removal from YouTube. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit erred in failing to align Aalmuhammed with
Garcia.
Aalmuhammed defined an author as, among other
definitions, “the person to whom the work owes its origin and
who superintended the whole work, the ‘master mind.’ ” 166 The
Aalmuhammed court limited authorship to “someone at the top
of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the
director, possibly the star, or the screenwriter - someone who
has artistic control.” 167 Lastly, the Aalmuhammed court noted
that an author should “superintend” the work by, for example,
arranging the positioning of the people in the film. 168
Under Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind” 169
of the Film. Garcia appeared in the Film for no more than five
seconds. 170 She did not produce the Film, did not direct the
Film, nor write the Film’s script. 171 These facts alone are
enough to conclude that Garcia is not the master mind of the
Film because Garcia is not exercising any artistic control or
superintending the Film.
However, Garcia concedes additional facts that support a
finding that Youssef, not Garcia, is the master mind of the
Film. Garcia concedes that Youssef was “the writer and
producer” of the Film. 172 Garcia also concedes that Youssef
“managed all aspects of production.” 173 Thus, the Ninth Circuit

165. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, N.R.,
dissenting); See also supra note 78. The dissent also argued that Garcia’s interest
in her acting performance could be analyzed as a joint work with Youssef,
considering she relied on Youssef’s script, equipment, and direction. See Garcia,
766 F.3d at 942 n.3. Thus, Aalmuhammed is applicable.
166. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 1234.
169. Id. at 1233 (citation omitted).
170. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737.
171. F.A. Compl. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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should have held that Youssef, not Garcia, was the master
mind of the Film.
2. A high degree of “control” should be required to
hold an actor or actress as an author.
The concept of control was discussed in Lindsay v. The
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic. 174 In that case,
plaintiff argued that she had a copyright interest in a film
because she closely supervised the filming of the motion
picture. 175 The court found that the plaintiff had a copyright
interest, but made clear the extent of control necessary to be
deemed an author of a motion picture:
All else being equal, where a plaintiff alleges that he
exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation
- including the type and amount of lighting used, the
specific camera angles to be employed, and other detailintensive artistic elements of a film - such that the final
product duplicates his concepts and visions of what the film
should look like. 176

Here, Youssef controlled all aspects of the Film’s
production. 177 Youssef’s control extended beyond the Film
itself, but also to Garcia’s performance in the film by virtue of
his control over production and scripting.
This alone
establishes that Youssef controlled Garcia’s performance and
is thus the author of her performance. 178
Moreover, Garcia’s control over her performance should be
considered in context of Feist, which recognized that Rural
might not have even selected to publish the names and
telephone numbers of its subscribers in the way it did. 179 The
Feist Court classified Rural’s control over its creative

174. Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15837 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1999).
175. Id. at 4–7.
176. Lindsay, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15837, at 15.
177. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744.
178. See Doughtery, supra note 25, at 244–45 (“When one individual directs
and controls the expression of another, the general copyright principals . . .
suggest that the person who directs or controls the origination of expression is
the author of that expression.”).
179. See supra notes 55–57. Put simply, the argument was that the Kansas
Corporation Commission—not Rural—was the source of Rural’s alleged creative
contribution.
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contribution as the product of an external force. 180 The same
is true here. Garcia’s external force is Youssef, who is
controlling all aspects of production and scripting of the
Film. 181 Thus, Garcia’s performance is “devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity” 182 given that Youssef dictated the
production and scripting of Garcia’s scene.
The Ninth Circuit muddled United States copyright law
by holding that any time an actor contributes to a film with a
small performance that meets a minimal amount of creativity,
the performance is copyrightable and the performer can control
the distribution of said film. 183 However, a performer’s work is
arguably not considered original, and thus not copyrightable,
to the extent that the actor’s performance is not within his or
her control, i.e., the material is described in the screenplay, is
originated by the director, is dictated by necessity, consists of
standard, stock movements, or is copied from other
performances. 184 Moreover, an actor’s “general style” would
not be copyrightable since it is merely an idea, which is not
copyrightable subject matter. 185 As a result, a higher degree of
artistic control should have been required in Garcia, a burden
Garcia would be unable to meet. 186

180. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
181. F.A. Compl. at 5.
182. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
183. See generally Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property Law
In Support of Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., (9th Circuit No. 12-57302, April 14, 2014)
(hereinafter “Br. of Amici Curiae Professors”).
184. Doughtery, supra note 25, at 304.
185. See supra note 39. See also Doughtery, supra note 25, at 304; Feist, 499
U.S. at 345, supra notes 49–50 (holding that “independent creation” is a
requirement for originality). Here, an actor’s performance should not be found to
be an “independent creation” if a script or producer is controlling the performance
of said actor/actress.
186. See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright at 269 (2000) (reasoning that the legislative history’s statement that copyright would
not be extended to “social dance steps and simple routines,” H.R. Rep. No. 941476, at 54 (1976), may suggest a heightened creativity requirement). See also
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, supra notes 45–48, (recognizing that a
high level of creative control entitled an author of a photograph to copyright). See
infra Part IV.A for a discussion of a proposed solution to Garcia claims that
analyze the actor’s level of discretion in performing his or her role.
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3. Under Garcia, the exclusive right of a film’s true
author is weaker and potentially in conflict with
hundreds of individuals involved in the making of
said film.
Extending copyright to each contributor of a film renders
the true author’s exclusive rights afforded to him or her
meaningless. 187 An author could “not possibly exercise the
exclusive rights afford under the Copyright Act without
trampling on the rights of other contributors.” 188 Accordingly,
the true copyright owner would face undue restraints on his
ability to market his work because the owner would have to
gain permission from each and every performer who may have
rights in the underlying work before he could safely distribute
it. 189
4. The crutch of cases leaned on by Garcia are
misplaced and distinguishable.
Garcia relies on Fleet v. CBS 190 to support the proposition
that an actor’s performance in a film is independently
copyrightable. 191 However, Fleet analyzed a different issue. In
Fleet, the court considered whether the Copyright Act
preempts a cause of action for misappropriation. 192 The Fleet
court merely held that the actors’ misappropriation claims
were preempted because the images of the actors were taken
directly from a copyrighted motion picture. 193 That holding has
absolutely no bearing on the crux of Garcia’s claim because
merely finding something is within the scope of United States
Copyright law does not deem it protected by United States
187. See Booth v. Colegate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
188. Opposition of Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC to Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and Order of Impoundment at 15, Cindy Lee Garcia v.
Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, et al., (N.D. Cal. No. 12-8315, October 29, 2012)
(hereinafter “Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj.”).
189. Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 15. In other words,
Garcia conflicts with Congress’ intent by burdening an author’s copyright reward.
See supra note 90.
190. Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911, 1919–20 (1996).
191. Garcia Opening Br. at 31.
192. Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 10. This issue differs from Garcia
because the actors in Fleet did not state a claim for copyright infringement as
Garcia did. See supra note 127 for the causes of action Garcia filed against
Youssef, Google, and YouTube.
193. See Fleet, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1924.

4_FERRARI FINAL

400

3/25/2016 10:59 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Copyright law. 194 Stated differently, “the shadow actually cast
by the [Copyright] Act’s preemption is notably broader than
the wing of its protection.” 195
Garcia also relies on Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942
Canada, Inc., 196 for the proposition that a performer retains
the copyright in her performance unless she transfers or
assigns the right to another. 197 However, Jules Jordan Video
is distinguishable because, in that case, the actor also
produced, directed, wrote the script, and filmed the movie in
which he claimed a copyright interest. 198 By Garcia’s own
assertions, the Film was produced, directed, and controlled in
all respects by Youssef, not Garcia, which brings Garcia
outside of the scope of Jules Jordan Video. 199
5. Garcia is not narrowly tailored and stands in the
face of judicial efficiency.
The Ninth Circuit argued that its opinion is limited to
Garcia because “the vast majority of films are covered by
contract, the work for hire doctrine, or implied licenses.” 200
However, it is a stretch to assume that Hollywood studios—
while they may enter into contracts over intellectual property
rights with star actors—enter into copyright contracts with
non-leads like Garcia, much less with makeup artists, set
designers, and the variety of other contributors who may assert
litigable copyright claims under Garcia. 201 In fact, Warner
Brothers—one of the most sophisticated and respected studios
in the world—did not enter into a contract with

194. See Shelby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d. 1053, 1058 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (explaining that “scope and protection are not synonymous”).
195. U.S. ex rel. v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th
Cir. 1997).
196. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2010).
197. Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 16.
198. Id. (citing Jules Jordan Video, Inc., 617 F.3d at 1150.) The Jules court
explained Plaintiff’s contribution as a “one-man shop.” Id.
199. Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 16.
200. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936 (citing Doughtery, supra
note 25, at 238, 317–18, 327–33). Even the en banc panel argued that “[t]he
reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire doctrine govern much of the
big budget Hollywood performance and production world.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at
743 (citing 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07(b)(2)).
201. Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9.
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Aalmuhammed, 202 showing that studios do not always enter
into contracts with every person involved in production.
Although producers would ordinarily engage actors under
work for hire agreements, such agreements do not always
exist. 203 More importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion will not
be confined to Hollywood studios: it applies to everyone who
captures others on film, from professionals to amateurs to
technology companies and media outlets. 204 Thus, judicial
efficiency should be considered. Garcia does not provide
judicial efficiency because it allows anyone involved in a film
to claim a copyright interest, leading to a potential influx in
litigation and an uncertain standard for businesses to apply to
decision-making.
Lastly, multiple circuits agree on one principal:
broadening copyright authorship risks extending copyright
claims to overreaching contributors and denying sole authors
exclusive authorship status simply because another person
rendered some form of assistance. 205 Garcia brings those risks
to life by standing for the proposition that virtually any
sequence of actions captured on film will constitute a
copyrighted performance owned separately from the copyright
in the film. 206
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Garcia may have
a copyrightable interest for the following reasons: (1)
Aalmuhammed should have been afforded more consideration
and, under Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind”;
(2) a high degree of artistic control should be required to
classify an actor/actress as an author, and Garcia does not
demonstrate a high degree of control over her performance in
the Film; (3) the exclusive rights of an author are weakened
under Garcia; (4) the cases relied upon by Garcia are
distinguishable; and (5) Garcia is not narrowly tailored and
does not provide judicial efficiency.

202. See supra note 68.
203. Doughtery, supra note 25, at 306.
204. Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9. For a further discussion on the
effects of Garcia on technology companies, see infra Part III.C.
205. See Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 16–17. See also Childress v.
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 1991); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648
(7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “copyright would explode” if every contributor to
a collaborative work was afford authorship status).
206. Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9.
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B. Work For Hire Analysis
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Garcia was not an
employee of Youssef. The court reached this decision solely
based on the fact that Youssef was not in the “regular business”
of making films. 207 The Ninth Circuit arbitrarily relied on one
of twelve factors, despite the express instruction by the CCNV
Court to not weigh any one factor as dispositive. 208
Here, Garcia’s complaint is littered with facts that suggest
she is an employee. For example, Garcia admits she was hired
as an actress for a role in the Film; 209 Garcia was paid $500 for
her work; 210 and Garcia concedes that Youssef “managed all
aspects of production.” 211 Moreover, Youssef provided the
instrumentalities and tools, dictated the filming location,
decided when and how long Garcia worked, and was engaged
in the business of film making at the time. 212 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit erred by arbitrarily relying on one factor—whether—
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party—of
the twelve discussed in CCNV and ignored pertinent facts
related to those other factors.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit feared that classifying
Garcia as an employee of Youssef would transform “every
schmuck with a video camera [into] a movie mogul.” 213
However, the sole factor relied upon in Garcia—whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party—should
not be weighed heavily in this context. When an individual
takes a photo of the Golden Gate Bridge, he is entitled to
copyright over that photo. When an individual composes a
song, he is entitled to copyright over that song. Whether
photography or music is a hobby or a career has no bearing on
whether copyright is granted because copyright is an
automatic right that arises once an original work of authorship
is fixed to a tangible medium of expression. 214 Thus, whether
207. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936. In CCNV, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that no one factor should be treated as dispositive. See supra
text accompanying note 101.
208. See supra text accompanying note 101 for a restatement of the twelve
CCNV factors.
209. F.A. Compl. at 4, 27.
210. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 948.
211. F.A. Compl. at 5.
212. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 946 (Smith, N.R., dissenting).
213. Id. at 934.
214. See supra note 82.
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Youssef was an industry mogul or a “schmuck with a
camera” 215 should not have been treated as a dispositive fact—
and it was—in the court’s work for hire analysis. The Ninth
Circuit therefore erred in its work for hire analysis.
C. Beyond the Courtroom: Effects of Garcia on Technology
Companies
The Garcia court, prior to its en banc reversal, ordered
Google and YouTube to take down all copies of the Film from
YouTube and any other platforms within its control and to take
all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads. 216 Various
technology companies filed a joint Amici Curiae brief in
support of Google and YouTube which brought to light several
impracticalities of the Garcia opinion. 217
The Technology Companies argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s injunction was impracticable for the following
reasons:
(1) An online service cannot guarantee compliance with an
order preventing all new appearances of material. Any
combination of technological efforts and (at great expense)
manual efforts would surely fall short.
(2) Many online services, in particular smaller or newer
competitors, lack resources, technology, staffing, or the
appropriate architecture to attempt even partial
compliance.
(3) The added threat of contempt sanctions would compel
services to suppress lawful materials or withdraw their
services, and the effect would be either censorship of
legitimate speech or a loss of competition and choice in the
online marketplace. 218

The Ninth Circuit’s injunction was also worrisome because

215. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934.
216. Id. at 1269 n.9.
217. These companies included: Adobe Systems Inc.; Automatic Inc.; EBay
Inc.; Facebook Inc.; Gawker Media, LLC, IAC/Interactive Corp; Kickstarter Inc.;
Pinterest Inc.; Tumblr Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Yahoo! Inc (hereinafter “The
Technology Companies”).
218. Brief of Adobe Systems Inc.; Automatic Inc.; EBay Inc.; Facebook Inc.;
Gawker Media, LLC, IAC/Interactive Corp; Kickstarter Inc.; Pinterest Inc.;
Tumblr Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae In Support of Google
and YouTube’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Nakoula
Basseley Nakoula, et al., (9th Circuit No. 12-57302, April 14, 2014) (hereinafter
“Br. of Amici Curiae Technology Companies”).
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it shifted the burden of flagging copyrighted content from users
and onto Google/YouTube, which is contrary to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). 219 In enacting the
DMCA, Congress sought to remove the obligation of service
providers to monitor their services for infringement. 220 The
DMCA system sought, through the use of a notice-andtakedown process, to require users to provide notice of specific
instances of infringement in order to prompt a service provider
to take down the identified infringements. 221 The Garcia
opinion achieves the opposite by requiring Google/YouTube to
monitor the daily uploads to its website for potential
infringements.
The Garcia injunction is also contrary to precedent from
the Ninth Circuit. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 222
the Ninth Circuit held that an online service provider may face
liability for failure to take “simple measures” after it has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is on its system. 223
This standard cannot operate in the face of the injunction
issued in Garcia because proactive monitoring and filtering of
online content are not “simple measures.” 224 The measures
imposed in Garcia were formidable challenges, and even
sophisticated services would stumble in compliance efforts. 225
In addition, even though content recognition tools exist,
the most sophisticated of these tools have technical flaws. 226 To
be safe, a service provider must divert employees manually to
search and review material on its system continuously. 227
Lastly, online services are not editors of their users’ work. Nor
should YouTube even be expected to monitor for potential
infringements considering the volume of content uploaded to
its website on a daily basis. 228
219. Id. at 4.
220. Id. at 5.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi).
222. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
223. Id. at 729.
224. Br. of Amici Curiae Technology Companies at 9.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. YouTube is located in 70 countries and across 76 languages and millions
of people are subscribing daily.
See Statistics, available at
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html.
100 hours of video are
uploaded to YouTube every minute. Id. 80% of YouTube’s traffic comes from
outside of the United States. Id.
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For the above reasons, the Ninth Circuit erred in
assigning Garcia a copyright interest, erred in its work for hire
analysis, and failed to recognize the impracticalities posed by
its opinion.
IV. PROPOSAL
This proposal will first outline the suggested test for
actors/actresses claiming authorship of a motion picture. This
test will then be applied to three hypotheticals, which will
demonstrate the flexibility of this proposed test.
A. The Test
The proposal suggested in this Comment is a test for
authorship in the context of motion pictures. The test is an
extension of the Aalmuhammed “master mind” test 229 and
applies solely to actors and actresses who do not qualify as an
employee under the work for hire doctrine. 230
The test is as follows:
An actor/actress claiming copyright authorship
under Title 17 of the United States Code section
102(a) has the burden of proving that he or she acted
as the “master mind” of the motion picture by
exercising artistic and production control over both
his or her character and of the motion picture as a
whole.

Whether an individual was the master mind or has
production control should turn on the following: (1) the role of
the actor/actress within the motion picture; (2) the significance
of that role within the motion picture; (3) the level of control
and discretion afforded to the actor/actress in conveying his or
her role; and (4) the level of control afforded to the actor/actress
in production of the motion picture as a whole.
The first factor is a necessary threshold factual inquiry
that determines the individual’s role in the underlying motion
picture. This factor is not dispositive, but is highly probative
to the extent that the individual is not a lead actor within the

229. See supra note 166.
230. This test does not apply to individuals not featured in a motion picture
as an actor or actress because that issue was not before the court in Garcia. This
test only applies to an actor or actress who claims authorship in a film based on
his or her performance in said film.
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underlying motion picture. This factor is important because if
the individual is a mere “extra” or not heavily featured in the
motion picture, he or she should face a higher burden with
respect to factors two, three, and four. However, it is not
dispositive if the individual is a lead actor in the motion
picture, but it is informative to the extent that it is more likely
that a lead actor may qualify as the master mind of a motion
picture under this test. 231
The second factor addresses Jules Jordan Video to the
extent that it gauges the individual’s level of contribution to
the motion picture. 232 Courts applying this test should look for
a level of involvement that resembles Jules Jordan Video’s
“one-man-shop” analogy: an individual who produced, directed,
contributed to the script, and acted. 233
The third factor addresses the Feist concern of whether an
alleged creative contribution is the product of the actor/actress
or the product of a third party such as the writer, director, or
This factor is highly dispositive.
If the
producer. 234
performance is being dictated by an external force such as a
producer, director, or a script—like the Kansas Corporation
Commission in Feist 235—then the copyright claim of the actor/
actress should fail because the material does not originate from
the purported author, i.e., the actor/actress. 236 A highly
informative fact pertaining to this factor is whether the
screenplay or director mandated the performance of the actor/
actress or whether the actor/actress was afforded the
discretion to carry out his or her character. This inquiry would
ensure that the actor is truly “liv[ing] his part inwardly” 237 and
applying an “external embodiment,” 238 triggering the requisite
creative contribution needed to sustain a copyright claim. This
231. Aalmuhammed suggests this inquiry is relevant. See Aalmuhammed v.
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the role of the
individual, specifically whether they are the “star” is relevant because the “star”
is possibly the master mind of the motion picture).
232. See supra notes 196–99.
233. See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1150
(9th Cir. 2010).
234. See supra notes 55–57 (arguing that Rural’s creative contribution was
actually dictated by state law and not by Rural’s decision to alphabetize names
in the white pages).
235. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
236. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
237. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934. See also supra notes 135–36.
238. Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934. See also supra notes 135–36.

4_FERRARI FINAL

2016]

3/25/2016 10:59 PM

GARCIA V. GOOGLE

407

fact also ensures that the performance is truly an “independent
creation” 239 of the actor/actress claiming authorship.
The final factor gauges the level of control of the actor over
the motion picture as a whole. This final factor protects a
motion picture from being dissected into a patchwork of
overlapping property claims. This factor is relevant because if
an actor is found to be an author, said actor can dictate the
licensing and distribution of the entire motion picture. With
that in mind, the individual should have contributed to the
artistic and production decisions of the motion picture as a
whole. This factor, like the third, is highly dispositive.
However, a strong level of control and discretion under factor
three should overcome a weaker level of control under factor
four. Conversely, a moderate display of control and discretion
under factor three may be bolstered by a strong display of
control under factor four.
B. Hypothetical One
Assume an individual is cast as a substitute teacher in a
motion picture about a high school football team from Texas
that plays through a season of adversity and wins the state
championship. This motion picture is 140 minutes, and the
individual occupies one scene lasting approximately seven
minutes. Assume this individual was given a script, which
provided the actor with three pages of lines with the following
instruction:
Your character—the substitute teacher—must abide
by the following script.
Improvisation of your
character is not allowed. The substitute teacher is a
pushover who allows football players to show up
late, turn in assignments after due dates, and
provides special treatment to student athletes. In
performing your character, please perform within
these boundaries.

Applying the above test, the court should first conclude
that this individual was cast as a non-lead substitute teacher
in a motion picture that is primarily about high school football.
The individual also occupied only seven minutes of screen time.
Consequently, this individual would face a high burden in
demonstrating control and discretion under the third and
239. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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fourth factors. Turning to the second factor, the court should
conclude that this individual’s role is not significant to the
overall motion picture, which is about high school football in
Texas. However, a strong showing of the third and fourth
factors can overcome a weak showing of the first and second
factors.
Turning to the third factor, this individual had no
discretion or control over his character because the script and
producer dictated his character’s behavior. As a result, his
creative contribution was dictated by an external force and
should not be found to be original. Finally, turning to the forth
factor, this individual had no control over production or over
the motion picture as a whole.
Therefore, this individual has a weak claim of authorship
of this motion picture.
C. Hypothetical Two
For this hypothetical, assume an individual is cast as a
high school football coach in a motion picture about a high
school football team from Texas who plays through a season of
adversity and wins the state championship. This motion
picture is 140 minutes, and said individual appears in
numerous scenes occupying approximately seventy percent of
the motion picture. Assume the director or producer told this
individual that he will be provided with a general outline of his
scenes, but that the actor can improvise how his character will
perform within each scene. For example, one suggested outline
is:
Coach holds his first team meeting. The goal of this
meeting is for the coach to introduce himself. This is
the coach’s first season, and his goal in his first
meeting is to establish total control over the players
and program. The coach is aggressive and runs a
military style meeting.

Applying the proposed test, the court should first conclude
that this individual was cast as a lead in this motion picture as
the head coach in a motion picture primarily about high school
football. This individual also appeared in seventy percent of
scenes in the motion picture, demonstrating his character’s
significance. Turning to the second factor, the court would
conclude that this individual’s role is significant to the overall
motion picture. The high school football coach is at the core of
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a movie about high school football in Texas and is critical to
the motion picture’s success.
Turning to the third factor, this individual had total
discretion and control over his character’s performance.
Though the individual’s scenes were dictated by the script
outline, the individual was afforded discretion as to how his
character would demonstrate his control over his player
meeting. As a result, the individual could have applied many
acting techniques in carrying out his scenes and was required
to choose which techniques would best reflect his character.
Accordingly, this individual should be found to have a strong
showing of control because he implemented his creative
contribution in a way that was not dictated by an external
force. Lastly, we do not have facts suggesting that this
individual controlled the production of the movie as a whole,
but a strong showing of control and discretion under the third
factor can overcome a weak display of control under the forth
factor.
As a result of the above analysis, this individual has a
strong claim of authorship of this motion picture.
D. Hypothetical Three
For this hypothetical, assume an individual is cast as a
high school football quarterback in a motion picture about a
high school football team from Texas that plays through a
season of adversity and wins the state championship. This
motion picture is 140 minutes, and said individual appears in
numerous scenes occupying approximately forty percent of the
motion picture. Assume the director or producer told this
individual that some of his scenes will be provided by a general
outline, allowing this individual to improvise how his character
will perform within each scene. However, other scenes will be
dictated by a script and will not allow improvisation.
Moreover, this particular individual also played high school
football in Texas and thus is being asked to contribute to the
general direction of the motion picture as a whole in order to
replicate the most realistic portrayal of high school football in
Texas.
Applying the proposed test, the court should first conclude
that this individual was cast as a lead because he is the
quarterback of a high school football team in a motion picture
primarily about high school football. Turning to the second
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factor, the court would conclude that this individual’s role is
significant to the overall motion picture. The quarterback of a
high school football team is at the core of a movie about high
school football in Texas and is critical to the motion picture’s
success. Moreover, the individual appeared in forty percent of
the film, demonstrating his character’s significance.
Turning to the third factor, this individual had some
control and discretion over his character’s performance. Other
scenes were dictated by a script and did not afford the
individual any control or discretion. Thus, this individual
should be found to have moderately implemented his creative
contribution. Lastly, the fourth factor bolsters this individual’s
authorship claim because he was asked to contribute to the
general portrayal of high school football in the motion picture
as a whole. This fact would help this individual overcome his
scenes that were scripted, a fact that would cut against his
copyright claim under the third factor.
This individual has a strong claim of authorship of this
motion picture.
As these hypotheticals demonstrate, actors and actresses
are often retained for a variety of roles within a motion picture
and are sometimes bound by scripted scenes or afforded
maximum discretion in how their performance will be
portrayed. The above test is ideal because it can be applied
flexibly to the wide range of circumstances surrounding the
retention, performance, and contribution of an actor/actress.
The above test is also ideal for this particular legal issue
because it: (1) aligns with the heightened requirements of
authorship articulated in Aalmuhammed; (2) ensures that an
actor/actress demonstrates artistic control over his or her
alleged independent creation; (3) protects the true author’s
exclusive rights to the motion picture by heightening the
burden required for an actor/actress to be deemed an author,
which would allow said actor/actress to control licensing and
distribution of said motion picture; 240 and (4) provides an actor/
actress with a remedy in the event his or her contribution truly
exceeds the bounds of his or her performance, warranting the

240. See supra note 189. Alternatively, the true author is protected because
the actor/actress must also demonstrate control over the motion picture as a
whole.
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right of copyright authorship. 241
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Youssef used Garcia as a pawn to further his
political beliefs. As reprehensible as Youssef’s deceit was,
Garcia was not an author of the Innocence of Muslims because
her five-second appearance fails to demonstrate significant
creative contribution and artistic control. The Garcia opinion
had the potential to adversely affect not only United States
copyright law, but also Hollywood and companies engaged in
content streaming. Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately
corrected the Garcia opinion through an en banc proceeding,
considerable debate regarding the authorship of supporting
cast members remains.
Thus, this Comment seeks to
introduce a novel test for evaluating future copyright claims
brought by an actor/actress.
For these reasons, the test for copyright authorship in the
context of a motion picture should focus on the level of control
and discretion of the actor/actress over both his or her role and
the motion picture as a whole. The proposed test avoids
improper grants of authorship while simultaneously providing
a remedy for an actor/actress who demonstrates a level of
involvement in a film that warrants copyright authorship.

241. For the reasons discussed in this Comment, it is critical to tighten the
requirements for authorship in the context of a motion picture. However,
Aalmuhammed nonetheless recognizes that the “star” of a movie could possibly
be deemed an author. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir.
2000). For that reason, the proposed test provides a remedy for an actor/actress
who demonstrates a level of involvement in a film that warrants copyright
authorship.

